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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
REVIEWABILITY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MILITARY PREGNANCY
DISCHARGE

Crawford v. Cushman
Civilian courts traditionally have refused to review military
administrative determinations.' Originally, this reluctance to review was merely one specific instance of the immunity from judicial
review then enjoyed by executive action.' Upon the demise of the
general proscription against reviewing executive actions,3 a more
restricted nonreviewability doctrine, limited to military determinations, emerged. Based both on the idea that military law constitutes
a separate system of jurisprudence4 and on an apprehension that
I See, e.g., Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296 (1911) (allegation of denial of due process
in discharge proceedings not reviewable); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953) (propriety
of physician's assignment to specific military duty not reviewable); Sherman, JudicialReview
of Military Determinationsand the Exhaustion of Remedies Requirement, 55 VA. L. REV. 483,
490-94 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Sherman]; Comment, God, the Army and Judicial Review: The In-Service Conscientious Objector, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 379, 413-39 (1968) [hereinafter cited as The Army and JudicialReview].
I Nonreviewability of executive actions was established at an early date. See, e.g., Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840); Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290 (1900).
Since military administrative determinations were considered executive actions, they were
beyond the reach of judicial review. E.g., Sherman, supra note 1, at 490.
1 American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902), has been
viewed as the first inroad into the proscription against reviewing executive acts. See Lee, The
Origins of Judicial Control of Federal Executive Actions, 36 GEO. L.J. 287 (1948). The
McAnnulty Court reviewed the Postmaster General's interpretation of a statute concerning
use of the mail for fraudulent purposes. The Court tried to minimize its departure from
precedent by stressing that the relevant question involved the statutory powers of a government official. While conceding that judicial review of the Postmaster General's determination
of fact was precluded under the nonreviewability doctrine, the Court emphasized that it is
within the unique province of the judiciary to determine if the acts of an official are justified
by law. Nonetheless, McAnnulty is an abrupt departure from the Court's earlier refusal to
review executive action in Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840). In that case,
the Supreme Court refused to review the Secretary of the Navy's interpretation of a federal
statute, notwithstanding the appellant's contention that the Secretary's actions exceeded his
authority.
' The concept that military law is a distinct system of jurisprudence was recognized in
England at the time of the Norman Conquest. The Army and JudicialReview, supra note 1,
at 414. See generally Barker, Military Law-A SeparateSystem of Jurisprudence,36 U. CIN.
L. REv. 223 (1967). This idea initially was applied by the Supreme Court to court-martial
decisions in Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857). In Dynes, military courts were
held not to be courts under article III of the Constitution, but rather executive agencies
created pursuant to articles I and H. Therefore, although habeas corpus provides an avenue
for collateral review of court-martial decisions, see, e.g., Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953);
Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879), they are not subject to appellate review by the federal
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judicial "interference" with internal military affairs could have an
adverse effect on the nation's security, 5 this nonreviewability doctrine served as an almost absolute bar to judicial review.
In recent years, the federal courts, while still recognizing the
importance of noninterference with military affairs, have manifested an unwillingness to apply a rule absolutely precluding review.' The considerations underlying the nonreviewability doctrine,
however, will often influence a court's disposition of the merits of a
case.' Utilizing a method of analysis designed to avoid undue defercourts. E.g., In re Vidal, 179 U.S. 126 (1900); Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243
(1864); W. WINTRmoP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENT 50 (2d ed. 1920). See generally Palsey,
The Federal Courts Look at the Court-Martial,12 U. PrrT. L. REv. 7 (1950).
This separate-system-of-jurisprudence rationale was extended to military administrative
actions in Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296 (1911). Reaves was a military officer who had
been ordered discharged on the basis of an examination board's recommendation. Suing for
reinstatement, he claimed, inter alia, that he had been denied due process. In rejecting this
argument, the Court stated:
[Wihat is due process of law must be determined by circumstances. To those in
the military or naval service of the United States the military law is due process.
The decision, therefore, of a military tribunal acting within the scope of its lawful
powers cannot be reviewed or set aside by the courts.
Id. at 304 (citations omitted).
A more recent application of the nonreviewability doctrine was made in Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953). Orloff, a physician who was inducted into the Army because of
his profession and was then denied both a commission and the opportunity to practice medicine in the Army, sought discharge by writ of habeas corpus. The Court refused to review
the propriety of Orloffs specific assignment to duty, and, while it did review the Army's
interpretation of a relevant statute, denied relief on the merits.
5 See, e.g., Peck, The Justices and the Generals: The Supreme Court and JudicialReview of Military Activities, 70 MIL. L. REv. 1, 9-16 (1975); Warren, The Bill of Rights and
the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 181, 187 (1962).
1 Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953), represents an important step in the direction of
a more flexible nonreviewability doctrine. See, e.g., The Army and JudicialReview, supra
note 1, at 429-30. The Burns Court, by authorizing the federal courts to inquire into whether
a court-martial tribunal had dealt "fully and fairly" with the allegations contained in the
habeas corpus petition, 346 U.S. at 142, expanded the scope of civilian court review of courtmartial convictions. A significant aspect of Burns is the Court's apparent repudiation of the
separate-system-of-jurisprudence concept: "[Tihe constitutional guarantee of due process
is meaningful enough, and sufficiently adaptable, to protect soldiers-as well as civilians
" Id. Shortly after Burns, in Harmon v. Bruckner, 355 U.S. 579 (1958) (per curiam),
....
the Supreme Court allowed review of a military administrative decision. The Harmon Court
permitted judicial review of a claim that the Secretary of the Army had exceeded his statutory
authority in discharging the plaintiff from the Army under conditions other than
"honorable." Significantly, the Court asserted that "judicial relief is available to one who has
been injured by an act of a government official which is in excess of his express or implied
powers." Id. at 581-82. See generally Sherman, supra note 1; Note, Judicial Review and
MilitaryDiscipline-Cortrightv. Resor: The Case of the Boys in the Band, 72 COLUM. L. REV.
1048, 1058-59 (1972); Note, Dissenting Servicemen and the FirstAmendment, 58 GEO. L.J.
534, 549-554 (1970).
1 It is submitted that although review is no longer completely precluded, the doctrine of
nonreviewability often leads to a substantial bias on the merits in favor of the military. This
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ence towards the military, the Second Circuit, in Crawford v.
Cushman,' not only reviewed a fifth amendment due process and
equal protection challenge' to a Marine Corps regulation that mandated discharge of pregnant members of the Corps,'0 but also concluded that the regulation was unconstitutional on both grounds.
Stephanie Crawford, a member of the United States Marine
Corps, learned in May 1970 that she was pregnant. At the time,
Crawford was assigned to an office in an administrative capacity.
When the Marine Corps discovered that she was pregnant, she was
discharged "for the convenience of the government."" Since the
Marine regulation then in force provided that a woman member
must be discharged upon certification that she was pregnant,12 neither Crawford's personal nor medical condition or history was evaluated with respect to her capacity to continue to serve.' 3 Seeking a
declaratory judgment and reinstatement, as well as back pay and
allowances, Crawford brought suit in federal district court. She contended that the Marine regulation which required her discharge
bias results from combining those general factors which weigh against review of military
determinations and the specific justifications advanced in support of the particular military
determination being challenged. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see text accompanying notes 39-46 infra.
8 531 F.2d 1114 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'g 378 F. Supp. 717 (D. Vt. 1974).
9 Although there is no equal protection clause in the fifth amendment, it has been
construed to prohibit discrimination by the federal government that is "so unjustifiable as
to be violative of due process." Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); accord, Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 500 (1975). Equal protection claims arising under the fifth
amendment are judged by the same general criteria as those arising under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 637 n.2
(1975); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 364 n.4 (1974).
0 Marine Corps Order P1900.16 6012 provided in pertinent part:
(c) Women members. Commanders shall discharge for the convenience of the
Government, or, in the case of overseas commands, will transfer to the continental
limits of the United States for discharge:
(3) A woman member, whether married or unmarried, upon certification by
a medical officer that she is pregnant, shall be discharged by her commander, for
the convenience of the Government, or in the case of overseas commands, will be
transferred to the continental United States for discharge. The character of the
discharge certificate issued in these cases will be as warranted by the woman member's service record, regardless of her marital status.
32 C.F.R. § 730.61(c)(3) (1976).
The Marine Corps recently abandoned the mandatory discharge policy, and now permits
pregnant women who are otherwise qualified to remain on active duty. See MCO 500.12
(1975), quoted in Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d 1114, 1117 n.1 (2d Cir. 1976).
" 32 C.F.R. § 730.61(c)(3) (1976). See note 10 supra.
12 See note 10 supra.
1 531 F.2d at 1116.
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violated the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection. Recognizing the Corps' need to insure the readiness and
mobility of its personnel, the district court upheld the regulation as
being rationally related to these objectives."
A divided Second Circuit panel reversed. 5 Judge Oakes, writing for the majority,"6 reasoned that the question of reviewability
should be treated as a separate threshold issue. Noting that federal
courts have reviewed military determinations, including discharges,
when constitutional issues or various other significant questions
were presented," Judge Oakes concluded that the constitutional
challenges in Crawford should be reviewed on their merits.'" In
support of this conclusion, the majority noted that the Supreme
Court has recently undertaken extensive review of military matters
on at least two separate occasions.' 9
Turning to the merits, the Second Circuit first examined the
mandatory discharge provision of the Marine Corps regulation on
equal protection grounds. Viewing the regulation as categorizing
military personnel on the basis of sex, Judge Oakes observed that
sex has not yet been declared a suspect classification. Rather than
applying the traditional rational basis standard,2" however, the
" 378 F. Supp. at 725-26. The district court reasoned that pregnancy results in a reduced
level of physical capacity which adversely affects the readiness and mobility of the Corps.
Id. Additionally, the court found that the needs of a pregnant woman and of a woman with a
dependent child could not be reconciled with the structured life of the military. Id. at 725.
For these two reasons, it was concluded that the regulation was rationally based. Id. at 726.
, 531 F.2d at 1116.
,e The majority consisted of Judges Oakes and Feinberg. Judge Moore authored a dissenting opinion.
" 531 F.2d at 1120.
, Id. at 1120-21.
" Id. at 1120. The two recent cases in which the Supreme Court has reviewed military
affairs are Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), and Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733
(1974). In Schlesinger, the Court reviewed a challenge to a statute which required that a male
Navy officer be discharged if he failed twice within nine years to be promoted to the grade of
lieutenant commander. Lieutenant Ballard argued that the statute amounted to a denial of
equal protection because women were exempt from its operation. 419 U.S. at 499-500. After
an extensive review on the merits, the Court upheld the statute on the ground that men and
women officers are not similarly situated. Id. at 508. Levy, on the other hand, concerned, inter
alia, a void for vagueness challenge to various sections of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice. Following a review on the merits, the Court upheld article 133, 10 U.S.C. § 933 (1970)
(conduct unbecoming an officer), and article 134, id. § 934 (neglect to the prejudice of good
military order and discipline), since previous constructions had limited the scope of the
sections and identified the conduct proscribed. 417 U.S. at 754.
2 The traditional lower tier of equal protection is applied when the legislative classification does not infringe on a fundamental right and cannot be said to be suspect. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection,82 HARv. L. Rav. 1065 (1969). For examples of fundamental rights, see, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (right to vote); Shapiro v.
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court utilized a more vigorous lower tier standard apparently
applicable in sex discrimination cases. 21 Under this test, a classification must bear a substantial relationship to its purpose in order
to withstand challenge.2 2 Endeavoring to identify the exact equal
protection issue before the court, the majority stressed that the
question was not whether it is rational to mandate the discharge of
women who were temporarily disabled due to pregnancy, while exempting from similar treatment nondisabled persons; rather, in the
court's opinion, the relevant issue was whether it is rational to mandate discharge of pregnant women while not requiring discharge of
other temporarily disabled persons.23 Finding that the principal justification for the mandatory discharge regulation was the Corps'
need to maintain readiness and mobility, Judge Oakes reasoned
that the distinction drawn between personnel temporarily disabled
due to pregnancy and personnel temporarily disabled from other
causes was not rationally related to that objective: "Why the Marine Corps should choose, by means of the mandatory discharge of
pregnant Marines, to insure its goals of mobility and readiness, but
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel). Among those categories treated as suspect
is race, see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 216 (1944). Under lower tier analysis a classification normally need have only a rational
basis to be upheld. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection,82 HARV. L. Rav. 1065
(1969). Thus, unless the classification rests "on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement
of the State's objective," it is constitutional. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,425 (1961).
On the other hand, if the classification either encroaches on a fundamental right or is itself
suspect, the statute is strictly scrutinized and, to be sustained, must be shown to be necessary
to the achievement of a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,
335-37 (1972).
" Although classifications based on sex have not been declared suspect by a majority of
the Court, the standard utilized when such classifications are challenged is more stringent
than the traditional rational basis test. Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976). Rather than
merely requiring that sex classifications be rational, the Court has required that they have a
"fair and substantial" relationship to the legislative purpose. Id.; accord, Stanton v. Stanton,
421 U.S. 7, 13-15 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 651-53 (1975); Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). See also Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther].
In discussing the equal protection issue, the Crawford court looked to its earlier decision
in Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973), for guidance. Green involved
a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) by a teacher who had been forced
to take pregnancy leave. In reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of the defendant, the Second Circuit reasoned that to require a physically capable woman to
take a payless leave was discriminatory treatment not justified by a legitimate state interest.
473 F.2d at 636. Of particular note in Green is the fact that the Second Circuit expressly
applied the more vigorous equal protection standard in a case that was viewed as involving
sex-based discrimination. Id. at 633-34.
2 See note 21 supra.
2 531 F.2d at 1122.
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not to do so regarding other disabilities equally destructive of its
goals is subject to no rational explanation." 4
In addition to invalidating the regulation on equal protection
grounds, the Crawford majority held the regulation violative of the
due process clause. The court reasoned that the Marine regulation
imposed an irrebuttable presumption that debility results from
pregnancy, a presumption not necessarily true in fact. 25 Accordingly, the Second Circuit found the regulation to be overly restrictive of the constitutionally protected right to choose whether to
procreate.2 6 In order to avoid the obstruction of this freedom, Judge
Oakes concluded, due process requires that before a woman is discharged an individual determination be made as to whether her
pregnancy will interfere with the Corps' need for readiness and mobility.?
24

Id. at 1123. Another justification advanced by the Marine Corps was the administra-

tive convenience in knowing where Corps members are at a given time and their ability to
respond in an emergency. This was also rejected by the Crawford court on the ground that
Marines suffering from other disabilities equally destructive of this goal were not subject to
mandatory discharge. Id.
Id. at 1124-25.
Judge Oakes stated that the regulation "penalizes the decision to bear a child by those
Marines whose mobility and readiness would not be reduced, either during most months
preceding birth or during their careers after birth." Id.
21See id. Having found the regulation to be violative of both equal protection and due
process, the court issued instructions to guide the district court's determination of the relief
to be afforded on remand. In fashioning these instructions, Judge Oakes noted that even if
Crawford had obtained an injunction prohibiting the Marines from discharging her under the
regulation, the Marines would only have been required to make an individual determination
of Crawford's capacity to continue to serve. It was impossible, the judge continued, to determine at such a late date whether the Marines would have been justified in discharging
Crawford after an individual determination had been made. Hence, the court held that
Crawford was not entitled to reinstatement. Instead, Judge Oakes instructed the district
court to award Crawford the pay and benefits which she had lost, calculated according to
"ordinary principles of damage law." Id. at 1127.
Judge Moore, in his dissent, argued that the relief authorized by the majority was
"nothing less than the monetary equivalent of appellant's reinstatement" and that "no court
has ever gone so far. . . ." Id. at 1129 (Moore, J., dissenting). The dissent is quite erroneous,
however, in asserting that "no court has ever gone so far." The Court of Claims has frequently
held that an enlisted service member who has been wrongfully discharged is entitled to pay
and benefits for the unexpired term of enlistment, minus any money earned during that time
as a civilian. See, e.g., Conn v. United States, 376 F.2d 878 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Middleton v.
United States, 175 Ct. C1. 786, 796 (1966); Clackum v. United States, 161 Ct. Cl. 34 (1963);
Murray v. United States, 154 Ct. Cl. 185 (1961). The formula used by the Court of Claims is
apparently what the Crawford court intended when it instructed the district court to calculate
damages according to "ordinary principles of damage law." The propriety of the Second
Circuit's use of this formula is further demonstrated by the fact that the Supreme Court has
approved the award of backpay to compensate former service members for wrongful discharge. See United States v. Brown, 206 U.S. 240 (1907); United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S.
483 (1886).
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Judge Moore dissented, objecting strenuously to the majority's
consideration of the case on the merits. Relying on Orloff v.
Willoughby, " a case in which the Supreme Court refused to review
the propriety of an inducted physician's duty assignment, the dissent argued that the nonreviewability doctrine dictated that the
case not be entertained on its merits. 9 The dissent further posited
that the constitutional principles of due process and equal protection do not necessarily apply to members of the military."
345 U.S. 83 (1953).
531 F.2d at 1127-28 (Moore, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1128. The dissent also argued that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. According to Judge Moore, there exist two administrative tribunals to
which the plaintiff could have appealed. The first of these bodies, the Navy Discharge Review
Board (the Board), referred to as the "Marines Discharge Review Board" by the dissent, was
established pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1553 (1970) to review the discharges of former members
of the Navy and Marines. See 32 C.F.R. §§ 724.10 - .110 (1976). The dissent declared that
the Board was "empowered to recommend . . . eliminat[ing] the discharge and restor[ing]
the party to his or her prior duty and rank." 531 F.2d at 1130. This Board, however, apparently had power only to review discharges "to determine whether, under reasonable standards
of naval law and discipline . . . the type and nature of the discharge or dismissal should be
changed, corrected, or modified.
... 22 Fed. Reg. 3436 (1957) (current version at 32 C.F.R.
§§ 724.31-.32 (1976)) (emphasis added). While the Board did have the power to recommend
that a former member be permitted to reenlist, it does not seem that it had the authority to
recommend reinstatement; in fact, the Board was and is specifically denied the power to
revoke a discharge or reinstate a former service member. See 22 Fed. Reg. 3436 (1957) (current
version at 32 C.F.R. § 724.33 (1976)). Nor is the Board empowered to compensate a former
member for wrongful discharge by awarding back pay. Lunding, JudicialReview of Military
Administrative Discharges, 83 YALE L.J. 33, 41 (1973). Clearly, the Board could not have
afforded Crawford the remedies she sought, i.e., reinstatement, a declaration that her discharge was unconstitutional, and back pay and allowances. Thus, it was unnecessary for
Crawford to bring her case before the Board, since only those administrative remedies which
could lead to adequate relief need be pursued prior to seeking judicial review. See, e.g., 3 K.
ADMNISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 20.04, at 75-76 (1958); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 426 (1965); Lunding, Judicial Review of Military Administrative
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Discharges, 83 YALE L.J. 33, 71 (1973); Sherman, supra note 1, at 498.
The second tribunal discussed by the dissent, the Board for Correction of Naval Records
(BCNR), was established pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1552 (1970), and is authorized to correct
errors or injustices in the records of Naval or Marine Corps personnel. See 32 C.F.R. §§ 723.1
-. 11 (1976). Notwithstanding the seemingly broad nature of the BCNR's powers, resolution
of the constitutional question presented in Crawford is apparently beyond the competency
of that administrative tribunal, and resort to it prior to seeking judicial review is thus unnecessary. Cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 764-66 (1975) (question of the constitutionality
of a statute beyond the competency of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare); 3
K. DAVIS, ADMINSTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 20.04, at 74 (1958); Sherman, supra note 1, at 524
& nn.196 & 197. Moreover, a recent line of cases indicates that failure to appeal to the various
Boards for Correction of Military Records (BCMR), of which the BCNR is one, does not
preclude judicial review. Underlying these cases is the notion that resort to a BCMR prior to
seeking judicial review would not promote the purposes behind the exhaustion doctrine. See
United States ex rel. Brooks v. Clifford, 412 F.2d 1137 (4th Cir. 1969) (denial of petition for
rehearing); Cole v. Laird, 468 F.2d 829, 831 (5th Cir. 1972); Patterson v. Stancliff, 330 F.
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Clearly, as was emphasized by Judge Moore, a major obstacle
to the granting of review has been the traditional doctrine of nonreviewability. Orloff contained broad language which has been interpreted by some authorities as a reaffirmation of the absolute nonreviewability doctrine.3 1 More recently, however, Orloff has been
viewed as barring review only of questions concerning particular
assignments to duty and other such day-to-day military activities.32
Supp. 110 (D. Vt. 1971). Thus, although the Crawford majority did not discuss the question,
it is submitted that the plaintiff's failure to utilize these administrative remedies was not a
bar to review on the merits.
11The language used by the Orloff Court is, in part:
But judges are not given the task of running the Army. . . . The military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of the
civilian. Orderly government requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to
interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to
intervene in judicial matters.
345 U.S. at 93-94. This language is certainly susceptible to a broad reading, and courts have
so construed it. See, e.g., Arnheiter v. Chafee, 435 F.2d 691, 692 (9th Cir. 1970); Marshall v.
Wyman, 132 F. Supp. 169, 173 (N.D. Cal. 1955); Sherman, Legal Inadequaciesand Doctrinal
Restraints in Controlling the Military, 49 IND. L.J. 539, 574 (1974); Sherman, supra note 1,
at 527; Comment, Army Drug Treatment Programsand the Doctrine of Military Necessity:
Committee for G.I. Rights v. Callaway and United States v. Ruiz, 10 HARV. CrV. IrGHTS-Cxv.
LIB. L. REV. 215, 236 n.108 (1975); Note, PregnancyDischargesin the Military: The Air Force
Experience, 86 HARv. L. REv. 568, 577 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Pregnancy Discharges].
In Chavez v. Fergusson, 266 F. Supp. 879 (N.D. Cal. 1967), for example, the court relied on
the Orloff language and accordingly found that it lacked jurisdiction to determine whether
the plaintiff should be granted an. in-service conscientious objector discharge. Id. at 880-81.
32 Although some courts have read Orloff broadly, see note 31 supra, others have read it
narrowly, characterizing its sweeping language as mere dictum. See, e.g., McDonald v.
McLucas, 371 F. Supp. 831, 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Under this narrow reading of Orloff, which
appears to be gaining wide acceptance, the courts apply the nonreviewability doctrine only
to matters uniquely military in nature, such as standards of discipline or the propriety of
particular duty assignments. See, e.g., Denton v. Secretary of Air Force, 483 F.2d 21 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974) (reviewed discharge proceedings); Hagopian v.
Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201, 204 (2d Cir. 1972) (reviewed cadet's dismissal from West Point);
Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283, 294-95 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972)
(reviewed compulsory chapel attendance policies at military academies); Mindes v. Seaman,
453 F.2d 197, 199 (5th Cir. 1971) (reviewed separation from active duty); Sherman, Legal
Inadequaciesand DoctrinalRestraints in Controlling the Military, 49 IND. L.J. 539, 575-80
(1974); Sherman, supra note 1, at 493; The Army and JudicialReview, supra note 1, at 42529; Comment, Army Drug Treatment Programs and the Doctrine of Military Necessity:
Committee for G.I. Rights v. Callaway and United States v. Ruiz, 10 HARv. Civ. RIoHTs-Cv.
LIB. L. REV. 215, 236 n.108 (1975); PregnancyDischarges, supra note 31, at 577.
1 See, e.g., Campbell v. Beaughler, 519 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
855 (1976) (Marine hair length regulation reviewed); Committee for G.I. Rights v. Callaway,
518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (constitutional challenge to local commander's authorization
of warrantless searches reviewed); Allgood v. Kenan, 470 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1972) (courts
will review military affairs to insure that constitutional rights are protected); Antonuk v.
United States, 445 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1971) (reviewed allegation that military failed to follow
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The fact that many federal courts,33 including the Second Circuit 34
and the Supreme Court, 35 have reviewed military determinations
subsequent to Orloff bolsters this narrow construction. In addition,
the Crawford court's position is supported by the now generally
accepted principle that federal courts should review alleged en36
croachments upon the constitutional rights of military personnel.
its own regulations); Schatten v. United States, 419 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1969) (reviewed
allegation that military failed to follow its own regulations); Ashe v. McNamara, 355 F.2d
277 (1st Cir. 1965) (reviewed Board for Correction of Military Record's refusal to change a
dishonorable discharge to a discharge under honorable conditions); Murray v. United States,
154 Ct. Cl. 185 (1961) (propriety of military discharge reviewed). See generally Peck, The
Justices and the Generals: The Supreme Court and JudicialReview of Military Activities,
7G MIL. L. REV. 1, 44 (1975); Sherman, Legal Inadequacies and Doctrinal Restraints in
Controlling the Military, 49 IND. L.J. 539 (1974).
11The Second Circuit has actively contributed to the liberalization of the nonreviewability doctrine. It was one of the first circuits to conclude that civilian courts could review
the military's denial of an in-service conscientious objector discharge request. See Hammond
v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1968). Other circuits soon followed the lead of the Second
Circuit. See United States ex rel. Healy v. Beatty, 424 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1970); Packard v.
Rollins, 422 F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Brooks v. Clifford, 409 F.2d 700
(4th Cir. 1969). Ultimately, the Second Circuit's position on this issue was approved by the
Supreme Court. See Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 39 (1972).
See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733
(1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
11In the past, it did not seem that military personnel were entitled to the protections
afforded by the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 783 (1950); Ex
parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 138 (1866) (Chase, C.J., concurring and dissenting); Dynes
v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857). More recently, however, courts and commentators
have recognized that members of the military are entitled to these protections. See, e.g.,
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Burns
v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142 (1953); Committee for G.I. Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466,
476 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Hough v. Seaman, 493 F.2d 298 (4th Cir. 1974); Allgood v. Kenan, 470
F.2d 1071, 1073 (9th Cir. 1972); Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cortright
v. Resor, 447 F.2d 245, 254-55 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972); Yahr v. Resor,
431 F.2d 690, 691 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 982 (1971); Warren, The Bill of Rights
and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 181, 188-89, 193 (1962); Note, JudicialReview and Military Discipline- Cortright v. Resor: The Case of the Boys in the Band, 72 COLUM. L. REV.
1048, 1071 (1972); Pregnancy Discharges, supra note 31, at 577. Interestingly, the United
States Court of Military Appeals has played a significant role in developing the constitutional
rights of members of the military. See, e.g., United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 43031, 29 C.M.R. 244, 246-47 (1960). See generally Quinn, The United States Court of Military
Appeals and Military Due Process, 35 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 225 (1961); Note, "Military Due
Process" and Selection of Court-MartialPanels:An Illogical Gap in FundamentalProtection,
2 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 547, 555-56 (1975).

Perhaps the case most supportive of the proposition that members of the military are
entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause is Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973). In Frontiero, the Supreme Court struck down as violative of equal protection
several statutes which required a servicewoman to prove dependency in fact to entitle her
spouse to receive certain military benefits, while automatically entitling the spouse of a
serviceman to the same benefits. It has been suggested that since the Court was willing to
strike down the statutes at issue in Frontiero, it is quite likely that all challenged military
regulations which are found to deny equal protection will similarly be held to be unconstitutional by the Court. Peck, The Justices and the Generals: The Supreme Court and Judicial
Review of Military Activities, 70 MIL. L. REv. 1, 44 (1975).
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If assailable at all, the majority's decision to review on the merits
can only be criticized on the ground that apparently no consideration was given to whether judicial review of the military activities
challenged in Crawford "would

. .

. seriously impede the military

in the performance of vital duties . . . . -1, Tempering this criticism, however, is the fact that the government did not argue that
the Marine Corps' regulation or actions were not reviewable, and
thus made no claim or showing that review would have any adverse
3
effect on the Corps. 1

By treating the question of reviewability as a separate threshold
issue, the Second Circuit has taken an approach which differs significantly from the approaches utilized by some federal courts. For
example, in Cook v. Arentzen,35 the District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia was faced with the issue of whether a Navy
regulation mandating the discharge of pregnant women officers was
constitutional. Rather than engaging in a separate threshold analysis of the question of reviewability, it appears that the Cook court
combined the question of reviewability with the merits of Lieutenant Commander Cook's equal protection challenge." Similarly, in
Gutierrez v. Laird,4 ' the District Court for the District of Columbia
did not consider separately whether it should review the military
determination in question. In considering Lieutenant Gutierrez'
equal protection and due process challenges to an Air Force mandatory discharge regulation, Judge Smith expressly stated that his
analysis on the merits was "tempered" by the nonreviewability doctrine.42
-" Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197, 201 (5th Cir. 1971). The fear that interference with
the military might adversely affect the nation's security, see note 5 and accompanying text
supra, would seem to mandate a case-by-case determination of reviewability, including an
assessment of the possible effects of review. See id. at 199, 201-02; Allgood v. Kenan, 470 F.2d
1071, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 1972); United States ex rel. Schonbrun v. Commanding Officer, 403
F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1968).
1 531 F.2d at 1120.
No. 73-332N (E.D. Va. Jan. 8, 1976).

, In sustaining the constitutionality of the Navy's mandatory discharge regulation, the
Cook court noted that "[ijudges are not given the task of running the Army." Id. at 11,
quoting Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93 (1953).
'
42

346 F. Supp. 289 (D.D.C. 1972).

Id. at 290. The Ninth Circuit, in Struck v. Secretary of Defense, 460 F.2d 1372 (9th

Cir. 1971), vacated and remanded for considerationof mootness, 409 U.S. 1071 (1972), also
failed to separately consider the reviewability of Captain Struck's equal protection challenge

to an Air Force pregnancy discharge regulation. That the court combined the reviewability
issue and the equal protection question is evidenced by its discussion of the merits; "Captain
Struck is asking us to displace the military authorities. . . and to say to the Air Force. ..
'You must not. . separate this woman from her military service. And you must not discriminate against her. . . ."' 460 F.2d at 1376.
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Although the approach taken by the Cook and Gutierrez courts
appears viable, it is submitted that it may lead to inequitable results. Combining the question of reviewability with the substantive
analysis results in the plaintiff's claims being weighed not only
against the justifications for the specific military action or determination in question, but also against the general considerations
which discourage review of military determinations. Consequently,
the substantive analysis is subtly biased in the military's favor 3 and
extreme deference is afforded the military on the merits. The approach utilized by the Crawford court, a technique which has also
been used by other circuits,4 4 is preferable because it allows the
court to analyze the merits of the case without unduly deferring to
either party. 5 Yet, if the military would be adversely affected by
judicial review in any particular instance, this factor should be considered in making the threshold determination whether to grant
review. In addition, any legitimate special need the military might
have may be advanced as justification on the merits." By adopting
this approach, the Second Circuit appears to have struck a balance
between the unique requirements of the military and the constitutional rights of members of the Armed Forces.
Having resolved the threshold reviewability issue, the court was
faced with Crawford's challenge to the constitutionality of the regulation. In determining that the regulation violates the guarantee of
equal protection, Judge Oakes assumed that the Marine regulation
created a sex-based classification.4 7 Consequently, the regulation
was examined under the heightened standard of review seemingly
applicable when sex-based discrimination is involved.4" Although
the regulation in question appears to classify on the basis of sex, the
court's reasoning fails to take cognizance of the Supreme Court's
decision in Geduldig v. Aiello. 9 In Geduldig, the Court held that a
California disability insurance program which excluded pregnancy
from the list of covered disabilities did not establish a sex-based
'

See PregnancyDischarges, supra note 31, at 578-79.

" See, e.g., Denton v. Secretary of Air Force, 483 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,

414 U.S. 1146 (1974); Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971); Schatten v. United
States, 419 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1969).
' See Pregnancy Discharges, supra note 31, at 570-80.
" See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974); Committee for G.I. Rights v. Callaway,
518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
' 531 F.2d at 1121-22.
' See note 21 supra.
4' 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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classification 0 This would seem to indicate that a mandatory pregnancy discharge regulation does not engender a sex-based classification.-' Therefore, under the Geduldig reasoning, instead of applying
the more vigorous equal protection standard applied in sex discrimination cases, the Crawford court should have utilized the less demanding traditional rational basis standard.52 Had the Second Circuit analyzed the regulation under this standard, it is doubtful that
the panel could have concluded that the regulation was violative of
the equal protection clause. 3
Id. at 496-97 & n.20.
51The Geduldig court reasoned:
The California insurance program does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility
because of gender but merely removes one physical condition-pregnancy-from
the list of compensable disabilities ....
The program divides potential recipients
into two groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group
is exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes.
Id. at 496-97 n.20. The Court has recently reaffirmed that this language "leaves no doubt that
our reason for rejecting .

.

. [the] equal protection claim [in Geduldig] .

.

. was that the

exclusion of pregnancy ... was not in itself discrimination based on sex." General Elec. Co.
v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401, 407 (1976).
The conclusion that pregnancy classifications are not sex-related has been attacked on
a number of grounds. First, it has been pointed out that the Geduldig Court's identification
of the relevant classes created by the challenged statute is fallacious: "While it is true that
not all women are pregnant at any one time, all women, as a class, are susceptible to pregnancy (and bear in the United States an average of two children apiece)." Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classificationsand the Definition of Sex Discrimination,75 COLUM.
L. REv. 441, 448 (1975). Viewed thusly, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the statute
classifies on the basis of sex. See id. Moreover, on a very practical level, "[i]nsofar as pregnancy classification and stereotypes about pregnancy help perpetuate [the economic and
social inferiority of women], they are part and parcel of the problem we label sex discrimination." Id. at 461. Finally, it would appear that the Geduldig logic is readily applicable to
numerous other classifications, even those traditionally considered to be racially based. For
example, the Geduldig rationale could easily be used to find that an insurance program which
excludes sickle cell anemia from its coverage does not classify on the basis of race. See id.
Professors Lockhart, Kamisar, and Choper have propounded the following possible extension
of the Geduldig logic:
Consider the following description of a law that forbids blacks from becoming
lawyers: "The law divides all persons into two groups- blacks who wish to become
lawyers and all persons who do not wish to become lawyers. While the first group
is exclusively black, the second includes members of both races."
W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, & J. CHOPER, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 952 (4th ed. 1975). The
foregoing examples demonstrate that Geduldig does not state a rule generally applicable in
equal protection cases; the logic of that case must be confined in order to prevent abrogation
of the entire classification concept. Thus, it might be possible to argue successfully that the
Geduldig holding should be restricted to the disability insurance situation. Cf. Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1970) (economic and social regulation is subjected to a more
relaxed standard of review than legislation affecting Bill of Rights freedoms).
52 See 417 U.S. at 496-97 & n.20.
The Ninth Circuit in Struck v. Secretary of Defense, 460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1971),
vacated and remanded for considerationof mootness, 409 U.S. 1071 (1972), sustained an Air
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It is submitted, however, that the Crawford result is supportable under an equal protection analysis different from that employed by the Second Circuit. Since the Marine regulation appears
to penalize the exercise of the right to procreate, a right which has
been denominated fundamental by the Supreme Court,54 the regulation should be subject to strict scrutiny 5 Under this analysis, the
regulation cannot be upheld unless it is shown to be necessary to the
attainment of a compelling state interest.56 Once strict scrutiny is
invoked, underinclusive and overinclusive classifications are afforded little tolerance." Moreover, if the governmental objective can
be achieved by means that have a less drastic impact on the exercise
of the fundamental right involved, the classification usually will not
be upheld. 8
The pregnancy discharge regulation at issue in Crawford was
clearly underinclusive. It mandated that a woman be discharged
immediately upon discovery of her pregnancy, while other disabled
personnel were individually evaluated before a decision whether to
Force mandatory discharge regulation which was quite similar to the regulation challenged
in Crawford. Because Struck was decided prior to both Geduldig and the cases in which the
Supreme Court began to scrutinize sex-based discrimination more vigorously, see note 21
supra, the Struck court applied a minimum rationality test. See 460 F.2d at 1375. Struck,
therefore, illustrates the improbability of a finding of unconstitutionality under the traditional rational basis standard.
" The right to procreate has been recognized as a part of the right to privacy. See Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). Apparently, this right was first recognized in Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). There, Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, declared that
it is "one of the basic civil rights of man" and that statutes which infringe on the right to
procreate must be subject to "strict scrutiny." Id. at 541. More recently, the Court seems to
have reaffirmed the principle that the right to procreate is fundamental and that encroachment on that right triggers strict judicial scrutiny. See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973) (dictum); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Robinson v. Rand,
340 F. Supp. 37, 38 (D. Colo. 1972).
51A finding that a challenged regulation penalizes, interferes with, or infringes upon the
exercise of a fundamental right is necessary to apply strict scrutiny. See Memorial Hosp. v.
Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
37-39 (1973). In Crawford, the abrupt termination of a woman's chosen career solely because
she chose to bear a child appears to penalize the exercise of the right to decide whether to
procreate.
" See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 331, 342 (1972), quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (fundamental right cannot be infringed absent compelling state interest).
11See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 264 (1974); Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 345-52 (1972); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144-48 (1972);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969); Developments in the Law-EqualProtection,
82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1101, 1122 (1969); cf. Gunther, supra note 21, at 8 (strict scrutiny is
"'strict' in theory and fatal in fact").
-' See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 267-68 (1974); Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 H~Av.
L. REv. 1065, 1122 (1969).
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discharge them was made. 9 Exacerbating this underinclusiveness is
the fact that pregnant women, who may generally suffer less debility
than other temporarily disabled persons, may be the class of disabled personnel who are least likely to impair readiness and mobility.60 Indeed, the tenuous nature of the connection between mobility
and readiness and the mandatory discharge of pregnant women is
demonstrated by the fact that the Corps has abandoned the mandatory discharge policy and currently allows pregnant women to remain on active duty. Finally, the objective of readiness and mobility appears readily attainable by individual consideration of each
pregnant woman's capacity to continue to serve. It is this less drastic procedure which is utilized when other, perhaps more serious
disabilities are involved. Indeed, no justification for exempting
pregnant women from this procedure, other than mobility and readiness, was adduced by the government.
More cogent than its equal protection analysis is the Crawford
court's conclusion that the regulation denies due process of law. The
finding that the regulation violates due process seems to be dictated
by ClevelandBoard of Educationv. LaFleur,2 wherein the Supreme
Court held that two boards of education mandatory pregnancy leave
rules similar to the Marine Corps regulation challenged in Crawford
created the irrebuttable presumption that disability results from
pregnancy.63 The LaFleur Court reasoned that not all women would
be disabled at the point at which they were required to take leave,
and concluded that an individual determination of each teacher's
capabilities and disability must be made before the teacher may be
required to take pregnancy leave. 4 This reasoning 5 seems especially
5' See 32 C.F.R. § 730.5 (1976). It may also be argued that the regulation challenged in
Crawford is markedly overinclusive because it mandated the discharge of those pregnant
women whose condition did not impede the readiness and mobility of the Marine Corps. See
Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d 1114, 1123 (2d Cir. 1976).
11 It has been asserted that "[tihe period of genuine disability preceding childbirth is
normally brief, and delivery is followed by a rapid and complete recovery." PregnancyDischarges, supra note 31, at 590 (footnotes omitted). In Crawford, the district court concluded
that there was no medical reason why Crawford could not have performed her assigned duties
up until the seventh month of pregnancy. Moreover, Crawford returned to a civilian job six
weeks after the birth of her child. 378 F. Supp. at 720.
11See MCO 500.12 (1975), quoted in Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d 1114, 1116-17, n.1
(2d Cir. 1976).
.2 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
3 Id. at 644-48.
1,Id. at 647 & n.14.
11It should be noted that irrebuttable presumption analysis is not beyond criticism. See,
e.g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 772-73 (1975) (extension of irrebuttable presumption

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:334

applicable to the Crawford situation, where, without any evaluation
of Crawford's physical capacity to continue to serve, disability was
presumed from the moment of conception. Thus, the Crawford
court's conclusion that the regulation amounted to an irrebuttable
presumption and thereby denied due process appears to be correct.6
Notwithstanding the Crawford court's questionable equal protection reasoning, its conclusions appear to be sound. The decision
demonstrates that absent either a threshold showing that judicial
review would have an adverse affect on the military, or a showing
on the merits that there is a legitimate need to interfere with individual rights, the Second Circuit will afford military personnel the
same constitutional protections enjoyed by their civilian counterparts.
Donald I. Marlin
analysis could result in the destruction of many legislative judgments); Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HAv. L. REv. 1534 (1974); Note, The
Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or Due Protection?, 72 MICH. L. REV. 800
(1974). One student commentator has argued that this analysis seems to be a combination
of due process and equal protection. Note, The IrrebuttablePresumption Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1534, 1544-49 (1974). The Court's concern with the accuracy
of the classification in an irrebuttable presumption analysis is similar to the concerns of equal
protection analysis. See id. at 1547. On the other hand, the concern with individual determinations as opposed to automatic inclusion in a class resembles due process analysis. See id.
at 1548.
" Supporting the Second Circuit's due process holding is the Supreme Court's recent
reaffirmance of LaFleurin Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44 (1975)
(per curiam). There, the plaintiff challenged a Utah statute which denied unemployment
benefits to all pregnant women for the period extending from 12 weeks before the estimated
date of birth of the child until 6 weeks after birth. The Court, in a short per curiam opinion,
held that "unemployment compensation boards no less than school boards must achieve
legitimate state ends through more individualized means when basic human liberties are at
stake." Id. at 251.

